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Adoption of communication
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Gert Jan HOFSTEDE
Senior Researcher, Mansholt School for the Social Sciences,
Wageningen, The Netherlands
RÉSUMÉ
Les pays du inonde n'adoptent pas les nouvelles technologies de communication à la
même vitesse. Cet article se pose la question quelles variables, autres que le produit natio-
nal brut par personne, pourraient élucider ce phénomène. Se basant sur des données em-
piriques au niveau national, il conclut que des variables culturelles sont en jeu. En parti-
culier, les dimensions culturelles de l'individualisme et du contrôle de l'incertitude
prédisent la nature et la rapidité d'adoption des technologies.
Les différences culturelles entre pays vont-elles disparaître suite à la venue du « villa-
ge global,, ? Ce papier propose que bien ait contraire, les nouveaux média de communi-
cation permettent aux gens de renforcer leurs identités culturelles.
Mots-clés : Technologies de communication, Culture nationale, PNB par tête.
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the question what attributes of countries influence the differen-
tial speed at which they adopt new coin in unication technologies. On the basis of empirical
data, it concludes that besides GNPper capita, cultural variables predict the speed of tech-
nology adoption. In particular, the cultural dimensions of individualism/collectivism and
uncertainty avoidance can he used to predict the ease and speed of changes. Cultures of
strong uncertainty avoidance are slow in adopting any new technology
The paper also argues that, contrary to popular belief, the advent of the global village
does not lead to the disappearance or even to the lessening of cultural differences between
countries. On the contrary, new communication media enable people to strengthen their
cultural identities.
Key-words : Communication technology, National culture, GNP per capita.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Does the information age reduce the
distances between countries ? Certainly,
mass media have brought events that
happen all over the world to the at-
tention of billions of people. Likewise,
communication technologies enable
fast communication between people
wherever they are on the globe. But
does this also imply that we shall soon
all be living in a global village with
one shared global culture? Popular
wisdom among predominantly North
American businesspeople has been
that differences between at least the
developed countries are diminishing.
This belief is apparent in studies of
globalization that do not use national
culture as a relevant variable. For ins-
tance, King and Sethi (1998), in an em-
pirical study of transnational informa-
tion systems , address the business
environment of a firm, its structure and
management processes , and its infor-
mation systems configurations , without
considering cultural differences bet-
ween the countries in which a transna-
tional firm operates . They refer to dif-
ferences between countries only once,
when they define the concept of mar-
ket integration (p. 209): "Market inte-
gration refers to the extent to which
the parent corporation views the inter-
national market as a single competitive
arena . (...) The importance of this cha-
racteristic is emphasized by Bartlett
and Goshal (1989), who note that a
company cannot manage globally if its
managers identify with local, parochial
interests and objectives ." Although this
does not necessarily invalidate their
findings , it does indicate an implicit
belief that national culture is not an
important variable . And it begs the
question whether local interests are by
definition parochial . It certainly seems
congruent with the picture that Castells
(1996) draws of international business.
This could be described as the U.S.
market economy model extended to a
global scale : hard , flexible and oppor-
tunistic global capitalism . Could this be
nicknamed `Global U.S. parochialism'?
Some might say yes, see e . g. Blunt and
Jones (1997).
The specific focus of this article is
the diffusion of new communication
technologies . For the empirical part,
we shall look at this phenomenon
from a very high aggregation level:
that of nations . The central question is
whether there is more than just GNP
per capita that determines the spread
of communication technologies, and if
so, what is it? A corrolary question is
whether new communication techno-
logies are in fact cultural homogeni-
zers or not.
2. RELATED RESEARCH
2.1. Diffusion of Technology
Research on the diffusion of new
communication technologies abounds
in the literature . Various perspectives
are taken . Much U. S. research takes
place at the level of individuals. Jane
Webster (1998), for instance, uses the
perspectives of communication media
choice, systems analysis and design,
and privacy to investigate the use of
desktop videoconferencing in a North
American hightech organization. Kara-
hanna et al . (1999) report about a
study about the adoption of Windows
56
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3.1 in a large financial institution in the
U.S. Midwest. They use the theory of
reasoned action and aspects of inno-
vation diffusion theory, two theories of
personal attitude and intention.
Both studies are well presented
pieces of research, but it is very hard
to tell whether the results could be ex-
trapolated to other contexts, particular-
ly outside the United States. Smith and
Bond (1993) show that most psycholo-
gical research does not replicate well
across countries. They successfully use
the concept of national culture to ac-
count for many of the differences.
Robey (1995) has argued that theories
from the social sciences can often ex-
plain seemingly contradictory impacts
of information technology.
2.2. National culture
The concept of national culture has
rapidly become widely applied in the
IS discipline since the rise of the net-
work era. In this article, we adopt the
definitions given by Hofstede (1980,
1991, 2001). He defines culture as "the
collective programming of the mind
that distinguishes the members of one
group of people from those of ano-
ther". "Collective programming of the
mind" is what most people would call
education or socialization, i.e. it occurs
from early infancy on.
Hofstede distinguishes five dimen-
sions of national culture:
• Individualism versus collectivism.
This is the degree to which
people derive their identity pri-
marily from being an individual
versus being a member of social
groups.
• Power distance. This is the degree
to which differences in power, sta-
tus and privileges are accepted in
society, and considered a `natural
order'.
• Masculinity or achievement orien-
tation versus femininity or coope-
ration orientation. This distinction
could be relabeled "big and fast
are beautiful" versus "small and
slow are beautiful". It is related to
gender roles.
• Uncertainty avoidance. This is the
degree to which novel phenome-
na or ambiguity are perceived as
threats.
• Confucian dynamism. This dimen-
sion, also labeled short-term ver-
sus long-term orientation, has to
do with balancing the virtues of
tradition and the present against
those of the future.
For the sake of brevity, these dimen-
sions shall not be elaborated in more
detail here. Typically, Anglo-Saxon
countries are characterized by very
high individualism, small power dis-
tance, strong masculinity, weak uncer-
tainty avoidance and short time orien-
tation. Other countries have widely
varying combinations of scores.
2.3. Convergence or divergence?
Studies that consider national culture
as a potential determinant of technolo-
gical change have not found that the
world's cultures are converging. Craig
et al. (1992) carried out a longitudinal
analysis across 18 countries, including
16 European countries, the U.S. and
Japan. They pitted data for a number
57
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of indicators of economic develop-
ment against Hofstede's national cultu-
re dimension scores, much in the way
in which it is done in the present
paper, but using data for 1960, 1970,
1980 and 1988, thus creating an image
across time. Using multidimensional
scaling, they found several dimensions
of change. The most important of
these was "standard of living", associa-
ted among other things with the pos-
session of consumer goods such as te-
lephones and radios, which increased
most in individualist countries. The se-
cond most important was "cost of li-
ving", which increased most in collec-
tivist, large-power-distance countries.
They concluded that, contrary to their
expectations, countries were not
converging but diverging during the
period 1960-1988, and that the diver-
gence could be culturally explained
through differences in the cultural di-
mension of individualism versus col-
lectivism.
Inglehart and many others, in the
World Values Survey programme
(2000), have also found that national
value systems are resilient to changes.
The World Value survey programme
has run since 1981. It includes 65 so-
cieties containing 75% of the world's
population. Using data from three
waves of the World Values Surveys,
they found evidence of massive cultu-
ral change and the persistence of dis-
tinctive cultural traditions across coun-
tries. Values of younger age cohorts
are shifting towards postmoderniza-
tion, characterized by a declining role
of authority and a stress on personal
well being. In the parlance of Hofste-
de's dimensions, this would be called
smaller power distance and higher in-
dividualism. Inglehart and Baker
(2000) found that cultural change is
path dependent. They say that for the
duration of their research programme
(1981-2000), the broad cultural herita-
ge of a society - Protestant, Roman Ca-
tholic, Orthodox, Confucian, or com-
munist - leaves an imprint on values
that endures despite modernization.
2.4. Diffusion of technology
across countries
For those innovations that take
place in an international context, it is
obvious that national culture might
be one of the independent variables.
Many authors use the concept and
find it relevant. For instance, on the
basis of empirical investigations, Gar-
field & Watson (1998) caution coun-
tries to align their national informa-
tion infrastructure with their national
culture. Likewise, experienced au-
thors state that working in the infor-
mation age requires cross cultural
competency (Keen 1991, O'Hara De-
vereaux and Johansen 1994). Yet, the
concept of national culture is not al-
ways articulated much in the U.S. li-
terature in the field of information
Systems. Let us consider the series
"International Perspective" in the
Communications of the ACM. A.K.
Danowitz et al. (1995) discuss the
slow spread of information technolo-
gy across North Africa. They do touch
upon the issue of culture (p. 28): "the
computer evolved overwhelmingly in
the west in a manner compatible with
western mentality, language, cultural
and political values. When IT is injec-
ted into cultures such as those of
North Africa, it comes loaded with an
58
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embedded virtual value system.
There may be conflicts of social, po-
litical, and economic dimensions that
have to be resolved for widespread
assimilation to take place." Similar
statements have been made about
other technologies by other authors
(see e.g. Goulet 1977, Jaeger & Ka-
nungo 1990).
J.L. Dedrick et at (1995) discuss the
spread of information technologies in
very small countries. They define a
very small country as a country with
fewer than 10 million inhabitants.
Their sample includes the Scandina-
vian countries, Hong Kong, Ireland, Is-
rael, New Zealand, and Singapore. In
fact these are all the richest "very small
countries" in the world, except Swit-
zerland and Austria. This would indi-
cate that these two countries are the
outliers, not the nine in the authors'
sample! The authors conclude that En-
glish as a professional language is im-
portant. They also raise the issue of
government control over information
sources such as the Internet and ask
the question whether in countries that
are used to some government censor-
ship "political and social cultures will
have to change to deal with the po-
tential flood of uncontrolled informa-
tion."
In these two papers, the relevance of
national culture to the diffusion of in-
formation technology is mentioned.
But it seems that the non-western na-
tional cultures, not the technologies,
are seen as problematic. But whereas
the technologies change rapidly, the
cultures do not - so, defined in this
manner, the problem might not disap-
pear.
2.5. Group Support Systems
Group Support Systems (GSS) will
be used here as an example of a novel
PC-based communication technology.
They originate from an Anglo context,
and their assumed benefits reflect
Anglo cultural values: individual
contributions, equality in participa-
tion, reduction of pressure to
conform, task orientation, objectivity.
El-Shinnawy and Vinze (1997) carried
out experiments with U.S. (individua-
listic, small power distance) and Sin-
gaporese (collectivist, large power dis-
tance) MBA students. Groups used
face-to-face discussion or GSS to dis-
cuss a current topic. The authors ex-
pected the U.S. students would per-
form similarly in the two conditions.
However, it turned out that they
contributed much less in the GSS
condition. The authors attributed this
to the fact that their personal contri-
bution was not salient in the GSS
condition, making it less profitable for
them to contribute. They expected the
Singaporeans to be much affected by
the GSS, because it would enable
them to contribute anonymously ra-
ther than having to conform to the lea-
der's point of view. Against their hy-
pothesis, the Singaporeans behaved
similarly under the two experimental
conditions. The authors explain this as
follows: "Anonymity, however, is
counter productive to the fundamental
mechanism by which groups in col-
lectivist, large-power distance commu-
nities operate. (...) Rather than chan-
ging their behavior, GSS as a medium
of communication provides them with
a medium to continue behaving in the
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The authors do not state what seems
apparent from their findings, namely,
that anonymity is also counter produc-
tive to the fundamental mechanism
operating in the U.S. teams. This me-
chanism may be caused not only by
the individualism and small power dis-
tance in the U.S. culture, but also by its
strong masculinity. Observers from
countries low on masculinity have sta-
ted that U.S. people use meetings to
"show how good they were", and that
is, in the cultural sense, a masculine
value: one cannot show off when one
is anonymous.
Despite the Anglo origins of GSS, De
Vreede et al. (1998) report about unex-
pected successes with them in East
Africa. A possible explanation is that
using the GSS was a gratifying, status-
enhancing new experience for all par-
ticipants, perhaps also enhanced by
the presence of the researcher. It can
be inferred that taking a technology
out of its cultural context of origin
need not invalidate it, but one should
be aware that it might take on a diffe-
rent meaning in the new context.
Information technology other than
GSS also supports groups. Zhang and
Hao (1999) examined how ethnic Chi-
nese in the U.S. use the Internet to for-
tify their own cultural identity while
functioning within mainstream U.S.
culture. The use of the Internet or mo-
bile phones for diverse networks of
specialist, extremist or otherwise de-
viant groups, such as researchers, hoo-
ligans or criminals, is another case in
point. Such networks are not necessa-
rily endowed with a subculture of their
own, but they might well be. Making it
possible to communicate with those
who are similar, to the neglect of those
who are near, is a powerful attribute of
communication technology. Lievrouw
(1998) uses the label "heterotopic
communication" for a form of such
communication. "These personal and
technological devices allow individuals
(...) to avoid exposure to disagree-
ment, difference, or other information
that does not serve their direct pur-
poses or reflect their particular views
of the world (...)." Her definition is lin-
ked with individualistic, masculine cul-
ture traits. In fact, she shows how the
new technologies enable U.S citizens
to act out their national culture more
effectively than before.
2.6. Summing up
A preliminary conclusion to be
drawn from this review of various re-
searches is that
• at the level of nations, the increa-
se in communication across the
world has so far not led to a re-
duction of differences between
countries. Cross-national diffe-
rences in cultural value systems
are a meaningful device to explain
the persistent differences;
• at the level of individuals or
groups, people maintain cross-cul-
tural differences by shaping their
use of communication technolo-
gies to suit their cultural values.
3. DATA
The data on national culture that we
used as independent data were taken
from Hofstede (1980, 1991). The five
dimensions are computed as indices
60
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running from approximately zero to
one hundred:
• PD, power distance index;
• IND, individualism index;
• MAS, masculinity or achievement
orientation index;
• UA, uncertainty avoidance index;
• LTO, long term orientation index.
Although these data were collected
in the 70's, subsequent research has
repeatedly established their conti-
nued validity (Hofstede, 2001). Ac-
cording to Hofstede, countries that
become richer also become more in-
dividualistic over time, and power
distances tend to diminish. The other
dimensions do not vary over time
with national income. Smith and
Bond (1993) review a number of mul-
ticultural studies of values and sug-
gest on that basis that values are free
to vary in a number of ways inde-
pendent of the country's level of mo-
dernization. Hofstede himself (2001)
demonstrates that, while national cul-
tures certainly can vary with time, dif-
ferences in cultures across countries
are very long-lived.
The countries in this research are
those that were included in Hofstede's
data (1980). They were countries in
which the IBM Company had offices in
the early 70's. These are more or less
the same countries that nowadays
have a sizable deployment of new
communication technologies.
To measure the diffusion of new
communication media, the World De-
velopment Indicators published by the
World Bank (1999, 2000, 2001) were
used. Of these, the following demo-
graphic data were selected as inde-
pendent control variables:
• GNP per capita 1997 in US $. We
expected this to be a very impor-
tant determinant.
• Population density in people/
square km 1997.
• Total population as of 1997.
We did not expect the latter two to
be of importance, but we wanted to
check that.
The following indicators of adoption
of communication technologies were
used as dependent variables:
• Number of copies of daily news-
papers per 1,000 people 1996.
• Number of radios per 1,000 people
1996.
• Number of television sets per
1,000 people 1997.
• Number of personal computers
per 1,000 people 1997.
• Number of fax machines per 1,000
people 1996.
• Number of Internet hosts per
10,000 people July 1998.
• Number of mobile phones per
1,000 people 1997.
We shall call the above set of va-
riables the 1997 data set. Figures for
the next two years (1998 and 1999 ex-
cept Internet hosts for which data are
more recent by one year, and radios,
for which data are of 1997 and 1999)
have become available for all the de-
mographic and technology variables,
except number of newspaper copies.
We created a second and third data
61
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matrix from these so that we could
compare 1997, 1998 and 1999.
For the statistical part, the 1997 data
were split in two different ways:
• The 25 richest countries worldwi-
de. These were the countries with
a GNP per capita above $10,000.
None of these was missing in Hof-
stede's set. The richest one among
these is Switzerland, with $43,000,
while the poorest is South Korea
with $10,550. These countries are
the European countries Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Fran-
ce, Germany, Greece, republic of
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United King-
dom, plus Australia, Canada, Hong
Kong, Israel, Japan, South Korea,
New Zealand, Singapore, and the
United States.
• The countries that were in Hofste-
de's original sample. These were
the 25 richest plus Argentina, Bra-
zil, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Jamaica, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philip-
pines, South Africa, Thailand, Tur-
key, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zimbab-
we. The poorest of these is Nigeria,
with GNP per capita = $ 280. For
the African countries in this set, the
culture data indicate North, East
and West Africa, but these are not
categories in the World Bank data.
Egypt, Zimbabwe and Nigeria were
therefore chosen as representative
countries consistent with the origi-
nal IBM sample data. Croatia, Ser-
bia and Slovenia now represent
former Yugoslavia. Russia has been
added using culture score esti-
mates created by Geert Hofstede.
This makes a total of 56 countries.
The reason for using two data sets is
that we expected the role of GNP per
capita to be very dominant in the
worldwide data set. In the sample of
rich countries, the supposed influence
of GNP per capita on the data matrix is
much smaller than it is worldwide.
This would enable us to see what pre-
dictive power, if any, the culture
scores would retain among countries
of roughly comparable wealth.
4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Our main research question was: Do
any of the scores on Hofstede's five di-
mensions of national culture explain
variance in differential penetration of
communication media? To operationali-
ze this question, we created a number
of hypotheses. It should be noted that
our data do not allow us to make any
inferences as to the use that people
make of the communication technolo-
gies. As far as the data go, the use of a
PC might vary from idly sitting on a
desk as a status symbol to being vital
for its user as a means of communica-
ting daily with colleagues worldwide.
We expected GNP per capita to be
the main predictor in the worldwide
data set, and we expected it to be cor-
related with high individualism and
small power distance, as the literature
indicates (Inglehart et al. 2000, Hofste-
de 2001). Therefore:
Hypothesis 1: Individualism and
small power distance are significantly
associated with the penetration of all
62
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communication technologies. This re-
lation is moderated by GNP per capita.
The question now becomes: what if
we correct for the influence of GNP
per capita? The remaining hypotheses
convey our predictions after correcting
for the influence of GNP per capita.
We expected that individualism
would still correlate with penetration
of communication technologies, in the
same way that private time and space
are associated with individualism: as
part of people's identity (Hofstede,
2001). Likewise, we expected small
power distance to be still correlated to
communication technology penetra-
tion because in a society of small
power distance all citizens would wish
to purchase the technologies while in
a society of large power distance their
possession and use might be limited to
specific strata. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: When corrected for
GNP per capita, individualism and
small power distance will still be pre-
dictors of penetration of communica-
tion technologies.
We expected the other dimensions of
national culture to play a less dominant
role. As far as uncertainty avoidance
was concerned, we expected that no-
velties would take longer to penetrate
in societies of stronger uncertainty
avoidance, as De Mooij (2001) found in
her longitudinal study about the pene-
tration of various consumer goods
among European countries since 1960.
She found that penetration of new pro-
ducts correlated with weak uncertainty
avoidance, but that this correlation was
lost or inverted after a number of years
when the product had become gene-
rally established. Therefore:
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty avoidance
will correlate negatively with the spread
of new technologies: PC, Internet, mo-
bile phones. This correlation decreases
over the period of investigation.
We expected that there might be
some correlation between masculinity
and status-providing technologies. De
Mooij (2001) reports such a correlation
for ownership of multiple cars. She
also observes that this effect is not
clearly observable at macro level
(number of cars per thousand people).
It becomes manifest when you look at
second and third cars. In the present
study such data are not available for
the communication technologies. We
consequently expect a negligible cor-
relation. Therefore:
Hypothesis 4: Masculinity will not
correlate significantly with the spread
of communication technologies.
Finally, we expected short term
orientation to be correlated with a pre-
ference for immediacy of communica-
tion. The slower, asynchronous media
(newspapers, paper mail and perhaps
faxes) would thus be correlated with
long-term orientation. We have no data
about paper mail. Therefore:
Hypothesis 5: Long-term orienta-
tion will correlate significantly with the
spread of newspapers.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Worldwide data set
Pearson correlation coefficients were
computed between all the variables in
the 1997 data set. There was an abun-
dance of high correlations. The three
63
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years showed a remarkably stable pat-
tern despite huge increases in numbers
of new technologies. To illustrate this,
here are some correlations among the
independent variables (table 1).
GNP/cap correlated with culture di-
mensions for the 52 country sample:
with IDV = .68***, with PD = -.59***,
with UA -.25*
1997 1998 1999
IDV .68*** .70*** .73***
PD -.59*** -.63*** -.65***
UA -.25* -.27* -.27*
Table 1 : Correlations of GNP/cap
with culture dimensions for the 56
country sample (only significant
correlations are shown; * = p < 0.05,
*** = p < 0.005).
Because of these high correlations
between independent variables, we
ran a number of exploratory factor
analyses on the worldwide data set.
Gorsuch recommends factoring the in-
dependent and dependent variables
both separately and together to get to
know the pattern of variance (Gorsu-
ch, 1983, chapter 17). Factoring the de-
pendent variables without the predic-
tors (the independent variables:
demographics and culture dimension
scores) yielded one factor only. Ad-
ding the predictors changed the pictu-
re to four factors, each loading other
dimensions of culture. There are no in-
dependent variables scattered across
factors, which is desirable. When rota-
ted obliquely, the same factors emer-
ged as with orthogonal rotation, with
culture dimension scores aligned with
factors and correlations between fac-
tors not exceeding 0.2. We therefore
proceeded with the orthogonal solu-
tion using principal components analy-
sis and rotating with Varimax. Missing
values were excluded listwise. There
are many missing values for the LTO
scores. We therefore also ran a factor
analysis without LTO to see whether
this would affect the outcome. This
had the effect of collapsing the second
and third factor but otherwise left the
factor matrix very similar. We therefore
felt confident to use the version pre-
sented in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 pre-
sents the variance explained for the
factors with eigen value > 1. Table 4
presents the factor matrix.
Over the three years, communication
technology penetration changed consi-
derably. By far the largest relative
changes were increases in the numbers
of mobiles and Internet hosts (table 2).
Yet when the same factor analysis was
run on the 1998 and 1999 data sets, the
results were strikingly similar.
1997 1998 1999
Radios 570 596 605
TV sets 349 363 359
PCs 130 149 160
Faxes 19 20 19
Internet hosts 123 165 236
Mobile phones 100 149 223
Table 2 : Average numbers per 1,000
inhabitants for the 56 country
sample across three years.
Because the factor matrices were so
similar, no further statistics were car-
ried out for the 1998 and 1999 data.
Table 4 shows that IDV and PD to-
gether form the first and most impor-
64
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tant factor. This factor is loaded by
GNP per capita, but the loadings of
IDV and PD are higher than that of
GNP per capita. We could label it
"Western style affluence". For the sake
of simplicity the name "Individualism"
shall be used for the variable that loads
the factor most strongly. All communi-
cation technologies, but for the num-
ber of newspaper subscriptions, load
on it.
The other factors each coincide with
one dimension of culture, and can
carry the name of that dimension.
Long term orientation is by far the
most important of these. It loads news-
papers and newer communication
technologies. Together, the first two
factors include the variance of GNP
per capita.
From 1997 to 1998 there are very few
changes. The most conspicuous of
these is that the loadings of PCs and
especially of mobiles on the uncertain-
ty avoidance factor show a marked de-
crease as predicted. From 1998 to 1999
there is a slight shift between factor 3
and 4, with Population loading more
on factor 4. The loading of mobile
phones on the uncertainty avoidance
factor continues to decrease. The diffe-
rential speed of decrease between mo-
biles and PCs reflects the fact that mo-
bile phones are becoming common
faster than PCs.
In order to be able to correct for the
variance caused by the demographic
variables, we ran a stepwise regression
with probability of F to enter (PIN)
=.05 and probability of F to be discar-
ded (POUT) =.1. The result is presen-
ted in table 5. Here, the many missing
values for LTO were a problem. Inclu-
ding LTO was so detrimental to the si-
gnificance of the analysis that we deci-
ded to leave it out. In the first regres-
sion step, only the demographic
variables were included. The culture
dimension scores were added in the
second step only, even if they correla-
ted more strongly with the variable to
be explained than did the demogra-
phic variables. We did this in order not
to mistake a wealth effect for a culture
effect.
At first glance, table 5 seems to give
overwhelming evidence that national
wealth as expressed through GNP per
capita is what primarily drives the
adoption of new communication
media. It has to be noted, though, that
GNP per capita is correlated most si-
gnificantly with individualism and
small power distance, and to a lesser
degree with weak uncertainty avoidan-
ce, and one could argue about the cau-
sality of these correlation coefficients.
As argued previously, there is evidence
that increased affluence leads to shifts
in individualism and power distance.
Individualism predicts the number of
radios, TV sets and Internet hosts.
Power distance has little effect when
other effects have been accounted for.
Only the number of PCs is negatively
associated with it. This could reflect
the fact that in large power distance
societies, wealth is divided so une-
qually that few people can afford to
buy a PC. However, this effect ac-
counts for only 1% of variance. The re-
gression makes it clear that power dis-
tance is not nearly as important a
predictor as individualism.
A few other trends can be noticed.
Notably, the number of PCs and mobi-
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le phones correlates negatively with
uncertainty avoidance, as predicted by
hypothesis 3. The correlations dimini-
sh over time as predicted.
Finally, the dimension of masculinity
versus femininity opposes faxes to mo-
bile phones and to Internet hosts. In-
deed, faxes are a one-way medium
and are therefore a typical medium for
issuing commands or orders. Mobile
phones, on the other hand, are a typi-
cal two-way medium.
But why is the number of Internet
hosts negatively correlated with mascu-
linity? This may be because in feminine
countries, public services are deemed
important, and Internet hosts are being
used in these countries as a vehicle for
public services (De Mooij, 2001).
5.2. Richest 25 countries data set
For the richest 25 countries, the only
dimension of national culture with
which GNP/cap correlates significantly
is UA at -.38`. This makes the correla-
tion coefficient matrix much easier to
interpret than in the worldwide data
set. Table 6 presents the correlation
matrix. Table 7 presents the results of
a regression analysis performed in the
same way as the earlier one.
Although the differences in wealth
among these 25 countries are still
considerable, it turns out that in this
sample, the culture dimensions are re-
latively more important for explaining
the differences than they are in the
wordwide set.
Overall, the correlations with culture
dimensions are similar to those in the
wider data set, but relatively stronger.
In the regression analysis, though, the
correlations with masculinity/feminini-
ty do not appear. This can be attribu-
ted to the relatively small proportion of
Latin countries in this sample. A positi-
ve correlation between number of TV
sets and power distance crops up in
the regression analysis. This could be
explained by the hypothesis that in
small power distance cultures people
might be less inclined to use a medium
in which they have historically been
forced to be passive listeners. Conver-
sely, inhabitants of countries with large
power distance would use radio and
TV to see and hear their leaders.
Rotation sums of squared loadings
Factor Total % of variance Cumulative %
1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
1 6.3 6.2 6.9 39.3 39.0 40.5 39.3 39.0 40.5
2 3.6 3.6 3.7 22.7 22.8 21.7 62.1 61.8 62.2
3 2.0 1.9 2.0 12.4 12.1 11.6 74.6 74.0 73.8
4 1.8 1.7 1.9 11.0 10.5 11.0 85.6 84.4 84.9
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Variable Factor





Predictors 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999
IDV (Individualism) .900
PD (power distance) -.811






Population -.369 -.461 -.313 .700 .642 .754
GNP per capita .676 .736 .776 .625 .573 .514





Mobile phones .469 .726 .777 .741 382 .300 .257
Faxes .624 .597 .364 .340 .398
PCs .801 336 .440 .392 .390
Internet hosts .873
Table 4: Rotated factor matrix for 56 country sample; loadings
above .3 are shown , above .7 in boldface . Loadings for 1998 and 1999
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P, step: Demographic variables 21 step: Culture dimensions
Medium GNP/cap or Pop density 3`d predictor 4"'/511 predictors
Newspapers GNP/cap, RI = .59 Popdensity, RI = .67
Radios GNP/cap, R' = .59 IDV, RI _ .69
TV sets GNP/cap, R2 = .67 Popdensity (-), R' = .71 IDV, R' = .74
PCs GNP/cap, R' = .84 UA (-), R2 = .87 MAS (-), R' = .90 /
PD (-), R'= .91
Faxes GNP/cap, RI = .70 MAS, R2 = .73
Internet hosts GNP/cap, R' = .42 IDV, R' _ .50 MAS (-), R2 = .56
Mobiles GNP/cap, R' = .66 MAS (-), R2 = .69 UA (-), R' = .71
Table 5: multiple regression for 56 countries sample 1997
(PIN = .05, POUT = .1)
Medium GNP/cap Pop density PD IDV MAS UA
Newspapers .48** .49** -.01 -.27 -.07 -.36*
Radios .32 -.18 -.26 .60*** .07 -.41*
TV sets .34* -.40* -.12 .63*** .16 -.06
PCs .68*** .14 -.35* .43* -.20 -.77***
Faxes .63*** .06 -.07 .21 .26 -.20
Internet hosts .32 -.19 -.39* .47** -.34 -.39*
Mobile phones .38* .28 -.22 -.07 -.37* -.46*
Table 6: Pearson correlation coefficients for 25 richest
countries across the world 1997
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1" step- Demographic variables 2111 step. Cultural dimensions
Medium GNP/cap or Pop density 31d predictor 4°' predictor
Newspapers Pop dens, R2 = .25 GNP/cap, R2 = .42 -
Radios - - IDV, R2 = 36
TV sets Pop dens (-), R2 = 16 GNP/cap, R2 = 32 IDV, R2 = .46 PD, R2 = 56
PCs GNP/cap, R2 = .47 UA (-), R2 = .77
Faxes GNP/cap, R2 = .40 -
Internet hosts - IDV, R2 = .22
Mobiles - UA (-), R2 = 21
Table 7: Multiple regression for 25 richest countries across
the world 1997 (PIN = .05 , POUT = .1)
6. HYPOTHESES REVISITED
Hypothesis 1: Individualism and
small power distance are significantly
associated with the penetration of all
communication technologies. This re-
lation is moderated by GNP per capita.
Hypothesis 1 is very strongly sup-
ported by all the analyses for all tech-
nologies with the exception of news-
paper subscriptions. The factor
analysis suggests that the central dri-
ving force behind the adoption of
technologies is a combination of indi-
vidualism and to a lesser extent small
power distance. These dimensions
load much stronger on the factor than
does GNP/capita. This value combina-
tion, it can be inferred from prior re-
search, is itself a consequence of in-
creasing affluence in countries with
certain existing value systems. The
growing loading of GNP/cap over the
three years may reflect increasing
wealth in the countries with high indi-
vidualism and small power distance,
resulting in increasing correlations bet-
ween GNP/cap, individualism and
small power distance, as is apparent
from table 1.
Hypothesis 2: When corrected for
GNP per capita, individualism and
small power distance will still be pre-
dictors of penetration of communica-
tion technologies.
Hypothesis 2 receives partial support
from the factor analysis, as argued
above. It receives additional support
from the 25 richest country data set.
For Radios, TV sets and Internet hosts,
Individualism is the prime variable that
explains their proliferation in the mul-
tiple regression. Small power distance
is never a determinant. On the contra-
ry, large power distance helps explain
the spread of TV sets.
Hypothesis 3: Uncertainty avoidance
will correlate negatively with the spread
of new technologies: PC, Internet, mo-
bile phones. This correlation decreases
over the period of investigation.
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Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by all ana-
lyses for PCs and mobile phones, both
for the negative correlation and for the
decrease over time. The trend is not
clear for Internet hosts. There are ne-
gative correlations, but they do not ap-
pear in the factor analysis or regres-
sions. It could be that Internet hosts
are not so much the domain of private
persons as PCs and mobile phones,
and therefore less sensitive to resistan-
ce to change.
Hypothesis 4: Masculinity will not
correlate significantly with the spread
of communication technologies.
Hypothesis 4 is falsified, though not
very strongly, by several correlations.
First, there are correlations of feminini-
ty with mobile phones, PCs and Inter-
net hosts in the regression analysis in
table 5. Then, femininity correlates si-
gnificantly with mobile phone prolife-
ration in the rich country data set
(table 6). Masculinity correlates with
faxes in the regression analysis of the
worldwide data set (table 5).
Hypothesis 5: Long-term orienta-
tion will correlate significantly with the
spread of newspapers.
Hypothesis 5 is not falsified. In the
factor analysis, the long term orienta-
tion factor loads newspapers and mo-
bile phones stronger than the indivi-
dualism factor, faxes about as strongly,
and PCs to a lesser degree. In the re-
gression analyses, we did not include
long-term orientation, so there is no
telling whether it would have cropped
up. Based on the very high loading it
seems likely that long-term orientation
does predict number of newspapers.
As far as the other loadings go (for
mobiles, faxes and PCs), long term
orientation could be a predictor in the
same way as individualism/small
power distance, i.e. through GNP per
capita as a moderating factor. The in-
fluence of the Asian economies is ma-
nifest here.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1. Effect of national culture
along dimensions
The spread of communication tech-
nologies naturally is dependent on the
wealth of a country. If one corrects for
the effect of GNP per capita, clear ef-
fects of culture remain.
Power distance is not strongly corre-
lated with the spread of communica-
tion technologies. There are slight cor-
relations, but they can largely be
accounted for by the effect of GNP per
capita. In regression analysis, they are
neither prominent nor consistent across
the three samples. Possible effects of
power distance on the distribution of
communication technology devices
among the population do not appear in
this research, but can be assumed.
High individualism is strongly corre-
lated with the spread of those commu-
nication technologies that enable
people to isolate themselves: radio,
TV, Internet hosts. This correlation is
manifest in the first factor from the fac-
tor analysis, which could be termed
"standard of living". It can be conside-
red to be in line with the findings of
Craig et al. (1992), who found that
standard of living measured in the pos-
session of consumer goods increased
most in individualist cultures. The cor-
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relation with the number of PCs is less
marked, but likely to rise as PCs beco-
me more widely accepted in uncer-
tainty avoiding countries.
Uncertainty avoidance correlates ne-
gatively with the spread of the newer
technologies: PCs and mobiles, nota-
bly. This correlation will disappear
over the years, but will be transferred
to the new technologies of the future.
The trend from 1997 to 1999 shows
that the correlation was on its way
down during that period.
Worldwide, masculinity correlates
positively with the spread of devices
for one-way communication (faxes)
and negatively with that of devices for
two-way communication (mobile
phones). There is a less prominent ne-
gative correlation with PCs and Inter-
net hosts. These correlations are not
found so strongly in the 25 country
data set. They are likely to become
more pronounced as the technologies
involved lose their novelty.
7.2. How are the technologies
used?
The figures show a relationship bet-
ween the numbers of devices across
countries. They do not show us how
the technology is being used. Fortuna-
tely, others have investigated this. Here
are two examples that show how di-
mensions of culture could play a role.
Ang & Nadarajan (1996) describe how
the Singaporean government uses the
Internet to maintain the type of censor-
ship that is customary in that country. In
their words: "One way to control tech-
nology is to use technology itself as a
control mechanism, and the Singapo-
rean government has looked into using
technology in censorship." Singapore is
characterized by large power distance,
strong masculinity and collectivism. This
value orientation can account for the
high level of control that the govern-
ment wishes to maintain over its citizens
and the forceful methods it employs to
do so. At the same time the country is
very low on uncertainty avoidance, and
this can explain why it is so fast in tur-
ning a novel communication technology
to its advantage.
De Mooij (2000, 2001), a researcher
in international marketing, processed
questionnaire responses from 15 Euro-
pean countries about internet use for
various purposes. In a multiple regres-
sion analysis, De Mooij empirically
found that "almost daily use" of the In-
ternet:
• for business purposes can be pre-
dicted by small power distance;
• for education/science can be pre-
dicted by femininity;
• for e-mail can be predicted by un-
certainty tolerance;
• for leisure/personal reasons can
be predicted by both femininity
and uncertainty tolerance.
Apparently, the significance of the In-
ternet is culture-dependent. In cultures
with large power distance, it is not
used for business, because it does not
fit with steep hierarchy or centralized
control, at least not in its present form.
The correlation of use for education
and leisure with femininity may be at-
tributed to the fact that femininity is as-
sociated with a focus on the quality of
life, rather than achievement. The cor-
relations with weak uncertainty avoi-
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dance will disappear over time, and
shift to newer technology platforms.
7.3. Further research
This study is based upon only three
years' data. Therefore, many of the fin-
dings are hard to interpret. It will be
particularly interesting to replicate the
study in a few years' time to see in
what direction trends are developing.
In all probability, current categories of
communication technologies will have
merged by then. New technologies
will take their place.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper has empirically demonstra-
ted that new communication technolo-
gies do not spread equally rapidly
across countries, and that this cannot be
attributed to differences in wealth only.
National culture plays a prominent role.
When a new communication techno-
logy is introduced, the dimension of
national culture that predicts its speed
of adoption is uncertainty avoidance:
the higher a country scores on this di-
mension, the slower will it be in adop-
ting a new technology. However, in
the course of a number of years, this
effect wears off. Mobile phones and
PCs show this trend over the study
period, 1997-1999.
Other dimensions explain the even-
tual level of penetration of the commu-
nication technologies. By far the most
important of these is individualism/col-
lectivism. Power distance plays a lesser
role. Wealth, individualism and small
power distance are strongly correlated,
but high individualism predicts penetra-
tion of established communication tech-
nologies (radio and TV) and Internet
hosts even after correcting for GNP/cap.
The masculinity/femininity dimen-
sion affects the differential penetration
of one-way versus two-way communi-
cation media (fax versus mobile), the
latter being more popular in feminine
countries.
The empirical part of the research did
not include data about usage patterns.
The same communication technology
can be used for different purposes
across countries. Other research sug-
gests that if the technology in question
is adopted, it is used in ways that are
compatible with the local culture. Far
from being a cultural homogenizer,
communication technology enables ex-
pression of cultural uniqueness. In other
words, people use the technology to ex-
press their existing cultural values in
new ways.
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